Patient choice: as attractive as it seems?
In the English National Health Service (NHS), the policy of 'patient choice' has been developed as a mechanism for creating capacity, improving access and making services more responsive to patient demands. The policy has been manifest in two ways. First, patients waiting more than six months for an operation are entitled to choose an alternative place of treatment. At least one alternative provider should be offered, including a booked time with a shorter wait, in an accessible location. Second, the policy of 'Choose and Book' has offered patients needing a hospital referral for elective treatment a choice of four or five providers. The choice of provider can range from an NHS hospital, an NHS treatment centre, a general practitioner with a special interest, a private hospital or an independent sector treatment centre. The choice must be informed, for example, by information on waiting times, geographical location and measures of quality of care.
In this issue of the Journal there are two essays on patient choice. Dixon and Le Grand (pp 162-66) explore the possible consequences of greater patient choice for equity, and review experiences of choice in other European countries. We invited three people to reflect on the concept of patient choice from different disciplinary perspectives -management, economics and sociology.
A managerial and organizational perspective
At first sight, choice may appear attractive. Who would not, after all, benefit from making informed decisions about their care in a system that provides a wide range of service options? However, making patient choice work in practice is problematic, not least because health care systems do not necessarily provide the sorts of choices that patients really value.
Whilst it is true that most patients like to make informed choices in consultation with their doctor, 1 this appears only to be true when discussing treatment options. Research reveals a general lack of enthusiasm from the public to use choice in the sense of exploiting competition to influence the services they receive (the exception being when faced with long waits for elective surgery). 2,3 Recent market research in England revealed that while 76% of patients wanted greater involvement in treatment decisions, only 31% wanted a choice of hospital or doctor, of greater importance than the opportunity to make a choice was the desire for such things, as good car-parking availability and the quality of hospital food. 4, 5 In most cases in England, it is the primary care doctor that makes the referral choice on behalf of patients. However, doctors have historically lacked the time, and often the desire, to offer choices or undertake informed consultations with patients and, as a result, access to alternative care or other providers has remained limited. 6 Exerting patient choice, therefore, often remains dependent on how vocal patients are with doctors about their needs 3 and on their subsequent ability to travel to alternative sources of care. 7 Due to these and other factors, choice in England has discriminated against the physically and mentally disabled, lower social classes, ethnic minorities and other hard-to-reach groups. 3, 7, 8 To make choice work effectively, health services face fundamental managerial challenges. During consultations, a more effective dialogue is required that blends patient preferences with proxy paternalism through an informed assessment of care options. This requires an integrated and effective information system which addresses key operational challenges such as the promotion of continuous training for professionals to use IT that is itself fit for purpose. 9 More fundamentally, primary care doctors need to be given the time to undertake longer consultations, whilst there must also be capacity in the system to offer viable care alternatives that are accessible to all types of patient.
Another concern is how patient choice can be compatible with attempts to provide integrated care, particularly to those with long term and/or complex conditions? This requires a highly co-ordinated system that guides patients to the most appropriate care settings -akin to a Kaiser Permanentestyle managed care system -rather than trusting to a choice-led system where competitive imperatives dominate collaborative incentives and effectively preclude integration.
Given the strategic and economic imperatives for the NHS to combat the growing burden of chronic disease, patient choice may ultimately become an illusion -a politically engineered game of 'Find the Lady' where the rhetoric supports the illusion of choice, but in reality patients take options already pre-selected for them. This, of course, may be no bad thing. While choice can be empowering for patients, it is clear that choice increases costs without any evidence for improved patient outcomes.
An economic perspective
Many high-income countries have long included choice for patients. 1 In some countries, this has included choice about the purchaser of care, as well as the provider.
So what is patient choice meant to achieve? Payers think that choice for patients is a good thing in its own right 2 -it is what people want. After all, people who can afford to opt out of public services often do so, to exercise choice. Governments want all citizens to experience the benefits of choice, irrespective of their incomes -universal access to a choice of services. Patient choice forces services to become more responsive to patients' wishes. It is also assumed that choice acts as a catalyst to improve care 3 and promote efficiency.
The economic evidence contradicts several of the assumptions that there are benefits for patients. Taking quality of care first, economic theory tells us that if there is a fixed price, its level will make a difference to the quality of care provided by each hospital. Those hospitals whose costs are above the price have weak incentives to improve quality because it will cost more to do so. Where markets are not very competitive, hospitals with costs below the price will also have weak incentives to improve quality because there is no rival hospital. Only where costs are below the price and the market really is competitive are there are strong incentives to improve quality. 4 What is more, the evidence is not encouraging. Fixed price payments under Medicare (in the US) are associated with a decrease in quality. 5 What about the effects of choice on equity of access to care (which has been and remains a cornerstone of policy)? Some patients may need more help than others to exercise their choices. For example, travel costs may matter more to less well off people. Competition between hospitals may also have an adverse effect on access. It is likely that, for each hospital, some treatments are profitable and others are not. This may lead to hospitals ceasing to provide unprofitable treatments. The price may deter hospitals who currently cross subsidize between activities, leading to them cutting out some services altogether. 5 While this may increase the efficiency of the system, the concurrent policy aim of maintaining equity of access for patients may be compromised.
Turning to the assumption that choice will improve efficiency, governments need to recognize that a consequence of patient choice is a form of market. Such a market will need regulation to avoid abuse of market power by providers, which reduces competition, and therefore efficiency. Regulation itself introduces its own set of costs and difficulties.
The costs of providing choice also need to be taken into account when considering the extent to which choice can promote efficiency. These include providing up to date information about providers, information that is not collected routinely in many health care systems. Providing the information in a usable form is difficult and expensive. In the Netherlands, a website for consumers is being prepared. 6 But in the US, even when information is made available, few patients use it. 7 In addition, patients are likely to need a health care professional to help them make their choice. In a pilot scheme in London, patients had a nurse to help them make a decision, but then went to see their general practitioner to finalize their decision, thus duplicating the use of resources. 8 A substantial investment in IT systems is needed. 9 Experience to date both in England and in the US does not indicate that patients choosing providers necessarily produces improvements for patients. And, to the extent it does, the costs are likely to be substantial. Clarity of thinking about what choice can achieve is vital-if choice is valued as a good in its own right, it may be worth the additional costs needed to allow it to operate properly. The question is whether the money could be better spent in other ways.
